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THE SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF CRIMINOLOGY
Marianne W. Beth"
Social sciences have reached a point
of development where their investiga-
tions into socially undesirable and pro-
hibited behavior should be liberated
from the fetters of juridical positivism.
Of course, a criminal is primarily and
distinctly a person who has been found
guilty by a criminal court of a definite
act or omission that is outlawed by
law or statute. But it does not follow
that criminology must limit its research
to such behavior or to that distinct
group of people. Already the Italian
scientist Garofalo, who coined the
word "criminology" in his work Crim-
inologia (first edition 1885) advised its
use in the narrower juridical sense and
in a broader sociological sense. This
wise advice is still appropriate for our
age that has come to learn that objec-
tive criminal behavior does not always
result in a societal reaction of a given
pattern, or that a given societal reac-
tion allows for conclusions concerning
a definite action evoking it. Criminol-
ogy tends thus to become the "science
of undesirable social behavior" and of
societal reactions to such behavior.
This problem recently has been dis-
cussed more widely, since Sutherland
directed the attention of scientists
toward the fact that socially harmful
and highly undesirable behavior of
I Ph.D., LL.D., Lecturer on Sociology, Reed
College, Portland, Ore.
2Edwin A. Sutherland, "White Collar Crim-
inality," American Sociological Review, V. (1940)
1-12.
certain types (white collar crime) was
not dealt with by the criminal courts,
but by boards, magistrates, or other
authorities. Sutherland insists that such
a differentiation of societal repressive
reaction does not alter the fact that these
acts are sociologically to be regarded
es crimes, and that these patterns of
behavior are to be included in the
science of criminal psychology and
criminology in general, although they
are not part of the criminological offi-
cial statistics.
Van Vechten, however, took excep-
tion to this suggestion.3 He stated that
"on theoretical grounds there is cer-
tainly enough significance in social at-
titudes to make social- sanctions as im-
portant a test of criminality as law and
social damage." Further it would be
difficult for the scientists to adjust their
teaching or their researches to a
changed definition. "As a matter of
practice there is a very considerable
body of research, conclusions, and the-
ory, admittedly valid for the ordinary
sort of underworld and underprivileged
character, which would have to be al-
most hopelessly incumbered with quali-
fying reserves if we are to include large
portions of the medical, legal, banking,
and other professions in the criminal
classes."
3 Courtland, C. Van Vechten, "The Toleration
Quotient as a Device for Defining Certain Social
Concepts." The American Journal of Sociology,
XLVI (1940), July, p. 35-43.
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Van Vechten's positive contribution
to the explanation of the phenomenon
of differential societal reaction against
different types of prohibited social be-
havior is the introduction of the notion
of Social Tolerance and of the concept
of "toleration quotient," based on the
social status of the person involved.
"To express the relationship between
objective behavior .and social status the
concept of the "toleration quotient" is
suggested. This would be a fraction of
which the numerator would be the ob-
jective behavior and the denominator
the measure of the community tolerance
for the particular type of behavior on
the part of members of the class to
which the person concerned belongs,
plus some individual factors. When the
numerator exceeds the denominator
formal and official action takes place;
the seriousness of the action having some
relation to the degree of excess. For
4uotients less than unity, social pres-
sure short of official action, but still
somewhat proportional to the value of
the quotient, are brought to bear."
But this concept explains very few
of the relevant problems. Is social
toleration primarily connected with
status? Does the problem, which Suth-
erland has started, imply that the man
of high social status can get away with
murder or theft, that is with that type
of "objective behavior," which would
be repressed by "formal and official
action," if perpetrated by a member of
the underprivileged classes? That may
happen. But Sutherland's "white collar
crime" was typically behavior of a pat-
tern which is obviously inaccessible to
the underprivileged classes. And the
"toleration" applies generally to this
pattern of behavior, and not to the
status of the perpetrator, at least not
in the first line.
In raising these questions, the inves-
tigator is nevertheless confronted with
the fact that societal repression is not
exclusively determined by the inten-
sity of social harmfulness of a pattern
of behavior, but that other important
factors enter into the pattern of reac-
tion. These factors are obviously many-
fold, and many of them are consciously
or subconsciously concealed from gen-
eral knowledge, because since times im-
memorial the ideal of impartial, that is
of mechanically equal justice, has been
upheld. This ideal, however, never pre-
vailed in absolute and unqualified form,
not even in theory, except during the
short period of Beccaria's influence on
continental European legislation. And
even then, there were remarkable dis-
tinctions to be observed, just those dis-
tinctions which have excited Suther-
land's attention.
One of the guiding ideas of societal
reaction seems to be a moderation in
employing repressive action. This mod-
eration disappears at times. For in-
stance, the excessive use of capital pun-
ishment during the 18th century may
easily induce the opposite conclusion,
namely that the social repressive ap-
paratus always tends towards a maxi-
mum of officiousness. Still, in balanced
times, the other tendency is clearly
observable. The last decades have seen
it at work in institutions like probation
and even parole; in all the social serv-
ices complementing and even replacing
social repression for- the underprivi-
leged classes. Moderation tends to ap-
pear as "toleration" in its initial stages.
What looks like "toleration" may be
social weakness. Caesar tells of the
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Gallic nobles, who appeared before
their informers with an enormous re-
tinue, thus demonstrating that the exe-
cution of an unfavorable judgment
against them would be hardly feasible.
A similar situation of general social
weakness or disintegration causes the
toleration of gansterism, but hardly a
regard for their status as members of
a privileged class. The fact exists that
society as an organized unit is not al-
ways mightier than some individuals
or groups. Society does not tolerate
these groups, but it must submit to
them until it gains sufficient strength
to deal with them.
There are obviously also cases, where
Van Vechten's explanation holds good.
There are individuals in every society
who seem so important for the gen-
eral welfare that society does not want
to interfere with their activity, even
if single acts are undesirable. Unfor-
gettable is the damage done by social
repression in the cases of Lord Byron
and Oscar Wilde. But such social op-
portunism is bound up with personal-
its, not generally with status. It is
based on the fundamental insight that
there is hardly such a thing as objective
behavior, but that the consequences
of each act vary according to the cir-
cumstances.
In other cases, for instance in the
case of delinquent children of well-to-
do parents, social interference may
seem unnecessary, on the objective side,
because the social harm has been
amended by the parents, and because,
4 It is theoretically assumed, such destruction
vould take place only in case of capital punish-
ment. But actually it can hardly be avoided,
except in unusually favorable circumstances,
subjectively, educational measures may
be taken by the family.
This is a special instance of the gen-
eral problem of whether society can
afford in a special case to prosecute,
or whether it can afford not to
prosecute. This dilemma is upper-
most in all legislation and still more
important in the practice of the
courts. Every formal and official prose-
cution adds to the social harm of the
criminal act the social damage of the
total or partial destruction of the per-
sonality of the perpetrator of this act,-
quite apart from the cost of his punish-
ment to the community. If there is little
probability of chronic criminosity, or
of infectious propagation of this type
of behavior, prosecution may be unad-
visable. On the other hand, infectious
crimes must be dealt with comprehen-
sively. Whether a crime is infectious,
and to what extent an objective tyipe
of behavior is dangerous, depends only
to a minor 'extent on the objective be-
havior. To a greater extent it is con-
ditioned by the "Gestalt" of the whole
situation, of which the objective be-
havior is only one detail. Much Euro-
pean legislation makes allowances for
such changes of seductive virulence by
supplementing a normally lenient type
of criminal statutes with provisions for
extraordinary measures. That means:
a general toleration may be revoked, if
a given type of crime spreads or
changes its importance through the
change of situation.
when the educational aspects of punishment pre-
vail. The law-abiding groups have always
supplemented the formal repression of a crime
by an ostracism, which it would be hardly de-
sirable to eliminate totally.
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Another instance of this differential
social reaction is to be found in the for-
mation of vigilance committees. Puni-
tive repression is only a supplementation
of suggestive regulative institutions,
neighborhood, church, family. When-
ever these institutions fail, punitive re-
action increases, either officially or un-
officially: as well, because in such a
situation of social disequilibrium the
social consideration for the individual
members is at a minimum, as because
the infectiousness of criminal acts for
this very reason is at a maximum. In
certain cases, the opinion of minor
groups may differ from the opinions of
society at large: Lynching of negroes
is due to a disregard of the social value
of a negro's life, and at the same time
to an exaggerated appreciation of the
danger of the spreading of negro crim-
inality. This dissenting reaction must
find expression in extrastatutory acts,
because it is expressly only by certain
groups, not by the society.
Failure of society to find the right
medium between lack-of vigilance and
exaggerated rigidity is one of the most
upsetting elements. Obvious "tolera-
tion" of objective criminal behavior
that has been generally outlawed by
society is very often the cause of revo-
lutionary or pre-revolutionary atti-
tudes.
Social reaction towards a given be-
havior is therefore always qualified by
sundry factors: by the social harm
done, by anticipation of its infectious-
ness, by a deliberation upon the cost
of prosecuting and the cost of not-
prosecuting, by the cost of applying
punitive measures, by the cost of inter-
fering with a personality of a given
social value. These deliberations find
sometimes expression in law and stat-
utes, as qualifications and exemptions.
Sometimes they work subreptitiously.
But they always are present. They are
the cause of the failure of legislation
ever to succeed in eliminating the hu-
man subjective factor in social reac-
tions of a formal nature.
But the true social distinctions are
based on other causes and expressed
in a different manner. It is the so called
"objective behavior," in which the
different types of "criminality" that are
characteristic of the different social
groups find expression, that is different.
As Hooton observed, the wish to gra-
tify one's desires in socially prohibited
and undesirable ways, may be the same
with members of all classes. But ex-
cept for a few very fundamental drives
that allow for expression only in a given
channel, the drives for self-assertion,
self-aggrandisement, forbidden gratifi-
cation will find a very different objec-
tive expression under different environ-
mental opportunities. Jack-rolling is
the adequate expression for the under-
privileged. It would be ridiculously in-
adequate to gratify the white collar
man's desires for quick money. The type
of violent assault is different with the
gangster and with the courtiers of Louis
XIV. It is by no means true that society
shows uniformly a higher "Toleration
Quotient" for members of the privileged
classes, as Van Vechten's formula as-
sumes. Society's differential reaction
pattern works both ways. But it is
seldom arbitrary. The history of the
repression of the duelling habit shows
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that. Of common practise in feudal
times, when everybody had to rely on
his own pluck, duelling is prohibited by
middle class moral and middle class
legislation, when the State is the general
common safeguard. But it remains ob-
ligatory for the body of officers and other
groups, whose social function is based
on personal courage. The pacifistic out-
look of 1918 aims at a total repression.
But the reaction of 1933 brings a total
reestablishment. Certain undesirable
acts, connected with trade and ac-
quisition of wealth, were likewise
handled when the acquisitive mentality
seemed the source of social welfare.
Political propaganda is a virtue in
democracies. European legislation be-
fore 1933 agreed in certifying to the
political criminal that he was not the
mean brand and ought to be handled
with velvet gloves, because the inde-
pendence of political thinking seemed
necessary for appropriate progress, and
because therefore society resolved to
put up even with abuses. But it is a
deadly crime in totalitarian states.
Thus society adhibits Toleration,
when not extermination but modifica-
tion of underlying drives is desirable.
Society and society's mores and legis-
lation find many ways of effecting dis-
criminate behavior reaction against be-
havior patterns, which seem to origi-
nate in mental attitudes that society
highly values at the given'time. Pareto
refers to the fact that society may at
times feel a scarcity of certain types of
61lite-representatives. In a time of war,
the strain on the military groups may
be excessive; the demand may exceed
the supply. This being so, who would
assume that society may prosecute with
cruelty the warlike and violent type of
man, and punish by repressive reactions
their typical criminality? "Then indus-
try and commerce develop and the sup-
ply, though remaining the same, no
longer meets the demand." (The Mind
and Society, §2045.) Who would expect
at such times a reaction against -wite
collar crime which might tend to di-
minish the supply of white collar work-
ers?
At a later period, when the supply
exceeds the demand, and when trade
and commerce are no more expanding,
the societal attitude must change. The
trading individual is no more so im-
portant for society. Thereby his trans-
gressions become more harmful. As
the given class is subject to a harder
pressure by the transition to a less
favored social status, the propensity to
make up for this deterioration through
fast methods increases. And the result
will be that society will replace lenient
methods by harsh reactions.
It is up to social science to contribute
to a clear understanding when such a
change of attitude on the part of society
is desirable. Social science must under-
stand the underlying mechanisms of re-
action; it must deal with antisocial be-
havior irrespective of status and irre-
spective of legalistic differentiations.
White collar crime is only one instance
of a general phenomenon. But as we are
changing our evaluation of its mean-
ing, it serves well to designate the un-
derlying problems of criminology and
criminal psychology.
